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 IS THE FORM OF THE GOOD
 A FINAL CAUSE FOR PLATO?
 Elizabeth Jelinek
 It is often assumed (see Ferejohn 2009, 155; Kraut 1992, 320; Penner
 2003, 208-10; Reeve 1988, 91-96; Rowe 2007, 134; Santas 1985, 223-24;
 Teloh 1981, 137; White 1979, 43-49 and 2009, 371) that the Form of
 the Good plays the role of a final cause for Plato. For example, Teloh
 remarks, "The Good ... is the final end towards which all things strive"
 (1981, 137). And Santas writes, "What conception of goodness did he
 have, which allowed him to think of the Form of the Good not only as
 the final cause of everything that we do" (1980, 374). The Form of the
 Good is described in the Republic as the end of all human action (505e),
 and, since this is undeniably a teleological notion, it might seem reason-
 able to conclude that explanations invoking the Form of the Good and
 teleological explanations are all of a piece for Plato.
 I argue that, if one assumes Plato's conception of final causation, the
 claim that the Form of the Good is a final cause is untenable. Let me
 emphasize that I am not arguing against the idea that the Form of the
 Good is a final cause under some definition of final causation; my argu-
 ment is that casting the Form of the Good in the role of a final cause
 in the Platonic sense is problematic. Let us call the assumption that
 the Form of the Good is a Platonic final cause "Assumption P." In what
 follows I examine Plato's notion of final causation and his theory of the
 Form of the Good. Ultimately, I argue that Assumption P is inconsistent
 with the text.
 1. What Is a Final Cause for Plato?
 For the sake of clarity, from this point forward I will refer to Platonic
 final aitiai as "Platonic teleological explanations" so as to distinguish
 them from Aristotelian final causes.1 We find one of Plato's accounts of
 teleological explanation in a familiar passage in the Phaedo (96a-99a).2
 Socrates begins by recounting his youthful attempts to learn about why
 99
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 (dia ti) anything is generated (gignetai ), destroyed ( apollutai ), or exists
 (i esti ) (96a5-10). He was excited to read the works of Anaxagoras because
 he had heard that Anaxagoras offered an account of the world in terms
 of Intelligence (Nous) (97bl0-cl). Socrates had expected Anaxagoras
 to say that everything in the universe is the realization of Nous's goal
 to design the world in the best way possible. Such an account would
 explain, for example, that the cosmos is spherical because it is best for
 it to be so. Ultimately, this account would show that the whole universe
 functions in a way that maximizes the good for all (97d6-98b5).
 To Socrates's disappointment, Anaxagoras fails to incorporate Nous
 properly as a causal entity in his cosmology; rather, he cites "air, aether
 and water and many other absurdities" as the cause for "the ordering
 of things" in nature (98cl, Gallop translation [Plato 1993]). Socrates
 says that this Anaxagorean explanation is entirely misguided - it is as
 absurd as saying that the "reason" Socrates is currently sitting in jail
 is that his bones and sinews are arranged in a seated position. He ac-
 cepts that having bones and sinews is necessary, "that without which
 the reason could never be a reason" (99b3-4), but "to call such things
 [as bones and sinews] reasons is quite absurd" (99a5) because the very
 same bones and sinews that "caused" him to sit in jail could have just
 as easily carried him off to exile in Megara (99al).
 Throughout this passage, Socrates is searching for what he calls a
 "real" or "genuine" aitia (tas hos alethos aitias, 98el), and the "bones and
 sinews" explanation fails to qualify. Sedley offers a compelling argument
 for understanding Socrates's genuine aitia as an entity that guarantees a
 particular effect by virtue of its essential properties (1998, 115-32).3 For
 example, in the final argument of the Phaedo , the soul is a genuine aitia :
 the soul, by virtue of its essential nature (a bringer of life), guarantees a
 specific outcome (life in the body it inhabits). Bones and sinews are not
 genuine aitiai because there is nothing about the essential nature of bones
 and sinews that guarantees the particular effect of Socrates's sitting in
 jail; those same bones and sinews could have carried him off to Megara.
 This explains one reason that Socrates is disappointed with Anax-
 agoras's account: "air and ether and water and many other absurdities"
 (98cl-3) fail to be genuine aitiai because there is nothing about their
 essential nature that guarantees, for example, the cosmos's position
 in the center (97e5). Indeed, "[t]hat's why one man makes the cosmos
 stay in position by means of the heaven, putting a whirl around it;
 while another presses down the air as a base, as if with a flat knead-
 ing trough" (99b6-9). The natural philosophers, thus, fail to provide
 adequate explanations because the aitiai they invoke do not guarantee
 the explanandum in question.
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 Notice that Socrates says
 In fact he seemed to me to be . . . someone who said that all Socrates'
 actions were performed with his intelligence , and who then tried to
 give the reasons for each of my actions by saying first, that the reason
 why I'm sitting here is that my body consists of bones and sinews
 (93cl-7, italics mine).
 He explicitly identifies the state of affairs to be explained: it is not merely
 his sitting in jail; rather, the state of affairs consists of a person who
 performs all actions with intelligence sitting in jail.
 This is an important clue for understanding Plato's teleological ex-
 planations. According to Socrates, the essential nature of intelligence
 is such that intelligent agents will always do what they believe to be
 best. Intelligence is, thus, a genuine aitia because it guarantees the
 same outcome every time: the outcome the agent believes to be best.
 Thus, Socrates says, "Intelligence should be the reason for everything.
 . . . [I]f thaťs the case, then intelligence in ordering all things must order
 them ... in the best way possible" (97c4-7). This highlights one of the
 distinguishing features of Platonic teleological explanations:
 PTE 1: Regardless of the particular state of affairs being explained,
 every state of affairs is the same in the following respect: each is
 brought about because the agent believes it to be the best state of
 affairs.
 Intelligence is a genuine aitia because it is its nature always to bring
 about what it judges to be best. This explains one reason that Socrates is
 disappointed with Anaxagoras's account: Anaxagoras failed to recognize
 that Nous , as an intelligent agent, will by its very nature always bring
 about what it believes to be best.
 Since cosmic intelligences are supremely intelligent, what they think
 is best actually is best. Thus, in the Republic , since god is intrinsically
 good, he can only be the cause of good things (379b-c). Similarly, accord-
 ing to Timaeus, "[I]t wasn't permitted (nor is it now) that one who is
 supremely good should do anything but what is best" (30bl, Zeyl transla-
 tion [Plato 2000]). This highlights another problem with Anaxagoras's
 account: not only did Anaxagoras fail to recognize that Nous, by its very
 nature, will always do what it believes to be best, he also overlooked the
 fact Nous is a supreme intelligence; thus, whatever Nous thinks is best,
 is, in fact, best.
 Intelligent agents always do what they believe to be best, but, in the
 case of human agents, their beliefs might be erroneous. Notice that, in
 Socrates's teleological explanation of his incarceration, one of the reasons
 he cites is that the Athenians judged it best to condemn him (98el-5).
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 The Athenians' belief about what is best is, in this case, wrong. Socrates
 contends that people do evil things only because they lack knowledge of
 the good; thus, what they believe to be best is not actually best ( Górgias
 467a3-4 ' Protagoras 352a8-358d4).
 From this, we can identify another feature of Platonic teleological ex-
 planations:
 PTE 2: The degree to which the outcome is actually best is directly
 proportional to agent's intelligence: the more intelligent the agent,
 the closer his conception of what is best is to what is actually best
 (in some objective sense).
 Consider the following Aristotelian teleological explanation: a spider
 builds a web for the purpose of trapping its prey. The spider does not
 have the intention of building the web for the purpose of trapping its
 prey, nor does it have the belief that building the web will accomplish this
 end; rather, it does so "by nature." According to Aristotle, every natural
 thing has some kind of "internal principle" such that each natural thing
 moves toward its own end without the conscious intention of doing so
 (Physics II 8).4
 Contrast this with the Platonic teleological explanations given in the
 Phaedo. A genuine aitia is one that identifies the reason in terms of an
 agenťs desire always to do what he thinks is best. This highlights one
 of several aspects of Platonic teleological explanations that distinguish
 them from Aristotelian final causes: while Aristotelian final causes need
 not invoke an agent with intentions, beliefs, and desires, it appears to
 be the case from the Phaedo passage that Platonic teleological explana-
 tions do.5
 PTE 3: There is an intelligent agent with beliefs, intentions, and
 desires.
 The fact that an agent is necessarily cited in a Platonic teleological
 explanation is significant. Intentional agency explains why the state of
 affairs obtains in the particular way that it does, at the particular time
 that it does, and in the particular place that it does. Thus,
 PTE 4: The intelligent agent is also the efficient cause of the state
 of affairs.
 We can summarize the Platonic teleological explanation as follows:
 PTE (complete version): There is an agent who is the efficient cause of
 the state of affairs; that is, he brings it about at a particular moment
 in time and in a particular manner. Moreover, his desires, intentions,
 or beliefs constitute the reason why the state of affairs obtains. This
 "reason why" reflects the same motivation regardless of the agent or
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 the situation: the agent brought it about because he thought that the
 state of affairs was best. The degree to which the outcome is actu-
 ally best is directly proportional to the agent's intelligence: the more
 intelligent the agent, the closer his conception of what is best is to
 what is actually best.
 At this point, it may seem as though Plato's theory of the Form of the
 Good dovetails perfectly with Platonic teleological explanations. The
 following questions seem almost rhetorical:6
 (1) Isn't the best outcome "best" by virtue of participating in the Form
 of the Good?
 (2) Isn't what is "best" determined by a Form? For example, the Philos-
 opher-King looks to the Forms to model his city, and the Demiurge uses
 the Form Living Thing as his model when crafting the cosmos. It seems
 that what is best is not determined by the agent's own judgment but,
 rather, by something external to the agent, namely, the Form.
 (3) Aren't agents motivated always to do what is best because of the
 Form of the Good?
 It seems reasonable to assume that Platonic teleological explanations
 are the same as explanations invoking the Form of the Good or that
 Platonic teleological explanations at least presuppose the theory of the
 Form of the Good. However, as I will argue, the two types of explanation
 are fundamentally distinct, making it difficult to see how either is the
 case for Plato. I respond to the questions listed above as my argument
 unfolds.
 2. Form-of-the-Good Explanations
 My argument does not depend on any particular interpretation of the
 theory of the Form of the Good, but it does presuppose the rather un-
 controversial thesis that the Form of the Good is not an efficient cause
 (see, for example, Vlastos 1969, 300, 309). For present purposes, I adopt
 Santas's widely accepted interpretation of the theory of the Form of the
 Good.
 Santas interprets the theory of the Form of the Good as follows. Each
 Form's "proper attributes" are those attributes it has by virtue of being
 the particular Form that it is. For example, the Form Circle is circular,
 and the Form Beauty is beautiful. A Form's "ideal attributes" are those
 attributes a Form has by virtue of being a Form , rather than some other
 type of object. Santas says that, by virtue of its "Ideal 1" attributes,
 the Forms are perfect, eternal, ungenerated, and unchanging. We find
 examples of what Santas calls "Ideal 2" attributes in the Symposium
 (211a3-8): [The Form Beauty] is beautiful in every respect, regardless of
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 what it is being compared to and regardless of how it is being perceived.
 According to the principle of One over Many, given that all Forms share
 these ideal attributes (Ideal 1 and Ideal 2), there must be a Form by
 virtue of which they have these attributes. This Form is the Form of the
 Good (Santas 1980).
 We can use the example of a circle to illustrate Santas's interpretation.
 A sensible circle is circular because it participates in the Form Circle;
 in this way, it resembles the proper attributes of the Form Circle. But it
 can't be the case that a sensible circle is good by virtue of its participa-
 tion in the proper attributes of the Form Circle. Santas's rationale for
 this is that there is not necessarily any connection between the proper
 attributes of the Form Circle (that is, being circular) and the Form of
 the Good. Indeed, it would be absurd if the Form of the Good were the
 cause of all of the Forms' proper attributes, because then both circular-
 ity and noncircularity (which is presumably the proper attribute of the
 Form Square) would be good-making properties (1980, 391).
 Santas concludes that a sensible circle is good insofar as it partici-
 pates in the Form Circle's ideal attributes, by virtue of which the Form
 Circle is a perfect circle that is always circular, regardless of what it
 is being compared to and regardless of who is perceiving it. Indeed, it
 does seem to be the case that one sensible circle is, in fact, better than
 another sensible circle to the degree to which it is unchanging and always
 circular in all respects, independently of what it is being compared to
 or who is perceiving it.7 If a figure appears to be circular to one person
 but ovular to another person, then the figure is not a good instance of
 a circle.
 3. Example: The Cosmos
 To evaluate Assumption P, let us examine a teleological explanation and
 a Form-of-the-Good explanation of the same object, the cosmos. Consider
 Plato's account of the shape of the cosmos in the Timaeus :
 And he gave it a shape appropriate to the kind of thing it was. The
 appropriate shape for that living thing that is to contain within itself
 all the living things would be the one which embraces within itself all
 the shapes there are. Hence he gave it a round shape, the form of a
 sphere, with its center equidistant from its extremes in all directions.
 This of all shapes is the most complete and most like itself, which he
 gave to it because he believed that likeness is incalculably more excel-
 lent than unlikeness ( Timaeus 33bl-cl, Zeyl translation [Plato 2000]).
 This passage offers the following Platonic teleological explanation of
 why the cosmos is spherical: the cosmos is spherical because a supremely
 intelligent agent, the Demiurge, gave the cosmos this shape, and he did
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 so because he thought that the sphere is the best shape for the cosmos
 given its function, which is to house all other living creatures. Because
 the agent in this case is supremely intelligent, what he judged to be best
 is actually best.
 In section 1 above, it was clear that the Platonic teleological explana-
 tion in the Phaedo of Socrates's incarceration required an agent. While
 it is generally thought that the Timaeus account fulfills Socrates's
 wishes in the Phaedo for teleological explanation (for example, Gallop
 in Plato 1993, 95; Lennox 1985, 197-99; Sedley 1998, 114; Strange 1985,
 26-27; Vlastos 1969, 297), it is less uncontroversial to assume that the
 teleological explanations of the Timaeus also require an agent, for this
 would require a literal interpretation of the Demiurge. As Zeyl remarks,
 "The controversy between a literal and a metaphorical reading of the
 Timaeus is almost as old as the dialogue itself' (Plato 2000, xxi). Here,
 along with Aristotle (Physics 251bl4-26) and many others, I assume the
 literal reading.8 1 follow Broadie's lead when she says, "My approach . . .
 starts by accepting at face value the account Plato has given" (2012, 7).
 Consistent with the literal interpretation are two theses that are
 relevant to my argument: (1) the Demiurge is an agent with intentions,
 desires, and beliefs; and (2) the Demiurge is external to his creation.
 As I will argue throughout this paper, thesis (1) is essential to the ex-
 planatory power of Timaeus's account. Timaeus describes the cause of
 the cosmos as follows: "[B]eing free of jealousy, [the Demiurge] wanted
 everything to become as much like himself as was possible. . . . The god
 wanted everything to be good and nothing to be bad" (29e2-30a3, Zeyl
 translation [Plato 2000]).
 It is precisely the Demiurge's desires that constitute the "real aitia"
 of the cosmos. As Johansen points out,
 So Timaeus answers the question, "What is the aitia of the creation
 of the cosmos, and its order, and its soul?", not by just saying, "this or
 that good," but by saying "goďs thinking and wanting that it should
 be good in such-and-such a way" (2004, 109).
 In other words, the genuine aitia of the cosmos is the god's wanting to
 make everything as good as possible (29d7).
 Thesis (2), that the Demiurge is external to his creation, highlights
 a feature that distinguishes Platonic teleological explanations from Ar-
 istotelian ones. Recall the Aristotelian explanation in which the spider
 builds its web without the conscious intention of doing so, but rather
 because of an internal principle moving the spider toward its telos. Based
 on such examples, we may characterize Aristotle's natural teleology as
 internal. Aristotle explains, "The best illustration is a doctor doctoring
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 himself; nature is like that" ( Physics II.8 199bl4-32). By contrast, in
 keeping with the literal interpretation, my argument assumes that
 Plato's teleology is external: the Demiurge is separate from his creation,
 just like a doctor doctoring a patient other than himself.
 Thesis (2) is compelling in light of arguments showing that it is nei-
 ther the case that teleology is inherent in the precosmos prior to the
 Demiurge's intervention, nor is it the case that intelligence is immanent
 in the cosmos.
 It is clear from Timaeus's description that the precosmic materials
 lack intelligence and are, therefore, bereft of any internal teleological
 cause. Timaeus says, "The god . . . took over all that was visible - not
 at rest but in discordant and disorderly motion - and brought it from a
 state of disorder to one of order" (30a2-6). He elaborates later:
 [T]he four kinds all lacked proportion and measure. . . . They were
 indeed in the condition one would expect thoroughly god-forsaken
 things to be in
 and excellent as possible, when they were not so before (53a9-b8).
 Teleological causes are, by definition, purposeful. By contrast, the "dis-
 order" of the precosmos and the lack of "proportion and measure" of the
 four kinds evidence the absence of any internal teleological principle
 at work. Since there clearly is no internal teleological principle direct-
 ing the precosmos, we can conclude that the organizing principle that
 causes the orderliness of the cosmos must be external to the pre-existing
 universe (Broadie 2012, 8).
 We can also rule out the possibility that intelligence is immanent in
 the cosmos. This is contrary to Cherniss's view, according to which nous
 is "a personification of the logical abstraction, 'intelligent causation' in
 general" (1944, 607). The idea that there is "'intelligent causation' in
 general" in the cosmos allows for the possibility of there being intelli-
 gent causes operating on their own in the cosmos. An account of such a
 cosmos might claim that the intelligent cause of humans, for example,
 resulted in humans being structured in such a way that is best for their
 well-functioning and that the intelligent cause of the cosmos had the
 effect of its having features that were best for the well-functioning of
 the cosmos.
 But this is not all that Plato is trying to explain in his teleological
 explanations. Recall Socrates's hopes in the Phaedo : "I suppose that in
 assigning the reason for each individual thing, he'd go on to expound
 what was best for the individual and what was the common good for air
 (98b3-4, emphasis mine). Similarly, the Demiurge desires "[flirst, that as
 a living thing it should be as whole and complete as possible and made
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 up of complete parts" (32d2-33al). Thus, Plato's teleological explanations
 seek to explain two things: why the features a particular has are best
 for that particular itself and why the features a particular has are best
 for the particular qua member of a harmoniously functioning system.
 If a whole is to have coordinated parts, it cannot be the case that each
 part has its own independently operating intelligent cause; there has to
 be an intelligent cause external to the whole that can coordinate these
 many parts (Menn 1995, 12).
 The need for an external coordinator is consistent with Plato's accounts
 of craftsmanship in other dialogues:
 Take a look at painters for instance, if you would, or house-builders or
 shipwrights or any of the other craftsmen you like, and see how each
 one places what he does into a certain order [taxis] , and compels one
 thing to be suited for another and to fit to it until the entire object is
 put together as an organized [tetagmenon] and orderly [kekosmnon]
 thing. ( Górgias 503d7-504a5)
 If there were many intelligent causes acting independently to direct
 things in the universe, then Timaeus would not be able to explain why the
 cosmos is a coordinated, systematic, and integrated whole. Timaeus's ex-
 planation thus requires that the Demiurge is separate from his creation.
 Let us now compare the teleological explanation of why the cosmos is
 spherical with a Form-of-the-Good explanation of the same explanan-
 dum :
 Form-of-the-Good Explanation of the Cosmos : By virtue of the cosmos's
 participation in the Form Living Thing, the cosmos resembles the
 Form Living Thing; since the Form Living Thing is spherical, so too is
 the cosmos. The cosmos is good to the degree to which it participates
 in the ideal attributes of the Form Living Thing, namely, perfection
 and eternality.
 There are important differences between the two explanations, and
 this poses a problem for Assumption P. The first difference is this: the
 Form-of-the-Good account answers the question, "Why is the cosmos
 spherical?" The teleological account of the cosmos answers the follow-
 ing additional question: "How did the cosmos come to be spherical?" In
 this case, the Platonic teleological explanation of the cosmos tells us
 that the intelligent agent makes the cosmos. Lennox makes a similar
 point: "Or, to put it in a manner Aristotle was fond of, given the theory of
 form-explanation in the Phaedo, we will still need a theory of why things
 come to have the features they do as and when they do" (1985, 203). The
 efficient component of the teleological explanation provides an answer
 as to how and why the cosmos came to be spherical at the particular
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 time that it did, in the particular place that it did, and in the particular
 way that it did, whereas the Form-of-the-Good explanation does not.
 But this isn't enough to call into doubt Assumption P. Proponents
 of P could argue that teleological explanations are merely reducible to
 Form-of-the-Good explanations with efficient explanations attached.
 In other words, the agent is merely the efficient cause but contributes
 nothing in the way of teleology.
 I argue that a Platonic teleological agent is not merely an efficient
 cause. This is because there is a second fundamental difference between
 the two explanations. Notice that both explanations account for the
 cosmos's spherical shape: on the teleological account, the cosmos is good
 as a direct result of the Demiurge's judgment about how to make the
 cosmos the best way possible; he engages in an "entire chain of reason-
 ing" (34bl) about how to craft the cosmos. But, according to the Formal
 account, the cosmos has its spherical shape by virtue of participating
 in a Form. The problem is this: if the cosmos has its shape by virtue of
 participating in the Form Living Thing, then why does the Demiurge
 need to evaluate the situation in order to "reason" about which shape
 is best for cosmos's function? In other words, if the cosmos is already
 good by virtue of its participation in the Form of the Good, why does the
 Demiurge have to use his judgment at all ? Why can't he thoughtlessly
 copy the cosmos's Formal goodness? Why did he have to, for example,
 think about whether the cosmos should have hands or feet, a smooth
 or rough surface, or whether it should be self-sufficient (33cl-34al)?
 According to the Timaeus account, the Demiurge's judgment is impor-
 tant: he uses it to figure out how to make the cosmos the best it can be
 given sensible-world conditions . On the Form-of-the-Good account, the
 cosmos is good by virtue of its resemblance to the Form Living Thing's
 ideal attributes. But this latter type of goodness is insensitive to the
 particular conditions of the sensible world in which the cosmos will ex-
 ist. Thus, the Demiurge cannot thoughtlessly copy the cosmos's Formal
 goodness because the cosmos is not merely good in a formal sense (that
 is, it is not merely good insofar as its shape is as perfectly spherical as
 possible); rather, part of what makes the cosmos good is the particular
 sensible features it has that enable it to function in a particular sensible-
 world circumstance.
 This highlights one way in which the Demiurge is faced with a more
 difficult challenge than many craftsmen: his model (the Form Living
 Thing) and his product (the sensible cosmos) occupy two different on-
 tological categories. Johansen imagines that a parallel to this would be
 an artist attempting to turn a piece of music into prose (2004, 57). The
 Form occupies the ontological category of being; thus, it is eternal, un-
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 moving, and unchanging, while the cosmos is part of the ever-changing
 realm of becoming. Because of this fundamental difference, one cannot
 simply reproduce the properties of the Form onto the cosmos, just as
 one cannot thoughtlessly copy the melody of a song into a piece of prose
 (ibid., 316-19). Thus, as Johansen states, "You cannot simply read off
 the composition of the cosmos from the formal paradigm" (ibid. 57).
 Instead, the Demiurge must use his reason to determine how to
 manifest Formal properties in a completely different medium - one that
 is always changing. One example of this is the Demiurge's invention of
 time. It is impossible for the Demiurge to reproduce the Form Living
 Thing's eternality in the cosmos. Using his reason, he concludes that
 the best way to manifest a Form's eternality in the cosmos is by creating
 time (37c6-d7).
 The ontological difference between the model and the product is not
 the only challenge the Demiurge confronts. The Demiurge must also
 contend with Necessity, the force at work in the cosmos that is respon-
 sible for brute facts about the physical world that may pose a constraint
 on the gods' construction.9 Thus, in addition to reasoning about how to
 manifest a changeless property in a changing medium, the Demiurge
 also has to figure out how to "persuade" Necessity - or compromise his
 crafting in light of its constraints - as he executes this task.10
 The importance of an agent's judgment in the Timaeus is consistent with
 Plato's accounts of craftsmanship in other dialogues. For example, in the
 Statesman (293e-296a), Plato says that a king cannot rule effectively
 by thoughtlessly following a set of universal laws; he must use his judg-
 ment to determine how different laws apply to different circumstances
 in the sensible world. In the Phaedrus , Socrates says that the "true"
 technê of rhetoric requires theoretical knowledge of souls and speeches
 (271a5-b5), as well as "the ability to discern each kind clearly as it oc-
 curs in the actions of real life" (271d7-272a8). In other words, the true
 rhetorician is able to use his judgment to determine how to apply his
 theoretical knowledge to situations as they arise in the sensible world.
 Clearly, Platonic teleological agents are not merely copy machines;
 due to their judgment, the particular has features that the Form does
 not. The agent's judgment is, thus, crucial to the explanation.
 4. Example: Human Eyes
 There is a further problem with Assumption P: Form-of-the-Good
 explanations and Platonic teleological explanations each account for
 different senses of goodness. To illustrate this, consider the teleological
 account of why humans have eyes ( Timaeus 46e8-47al). The Timaeus
 explains the creation of the cosmos in terms of the craftsmanship of the
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 Demiurge and his lesser gods. An explanation of why humans came to
 have eyes when they did, where they did, and in the way that they did
 can be given in terms of actions of the lesser gods, qua efficient causes:
 "The reason why humans have eyes is that the Demiurge (and his gods)
 think it is best that humans have eyes" (45b-47c).
 Plato answers the question, "Why do humans have eyes rather than
 some other instrument?" in a discussion of optics that explains why eyes
 are the best instruments for seeing (45b2-46c8). Then Plato explains
 "their highest function for our benefit for the sake of which the god gave
 them to us" (47a). In other words, why is it best for humans that humans
 have eyes? He offers two reasons. First, having eyes allows humans
 to view the movements of the celestial bodies, which, in turn, allows
 humans to grasp the concept of time (47al-bl). Second, having eyes
 allows humans to observe the heavens, and, from viewing the harmony
 of the heavens, humans will be compelled to order their own souls in a
 similarly harmonious way (47b2-c5). In this way, viewing the heavens
 will facilitate the development of a human's virtue.
 Let us pause here and note a significant feature of this Platonic teleo-
 logical explanation: like the teleological explanation of the cosmos, the
 kind of goodness this account explains is a functional good (eyes are good
 because they are the best instruments for seeing). But this explanation
 also accounts for the goodness of humans' having eyes (having eyes is
 good because it helps them become virtuous). I will revisit this later.
 If Assumption P is right, we should now be able to make the case
 that a Form-of-the-Good explanation of human eyes is equivalent to
 the Platonic teleological explanation. At the very least, the account of
 the goodness of eyes according to the Platonic teleological explanation
 should be consistent with the account of the goodness of eyes given by
 the Form-of-the-Good explanation.
 A Form-of-the-Good account of eyes would be as follows. Eyes partici-
 pate in the Form Eye, which participates in the Form of the Good. Eyes
 are good to the degree to which they resemble the ideal attributes of the
 Form Eye: that is, unchanging, perfect, and always what it is regardless
 of time, location, respect, or perspective. Surely, an eye that is closer to
 being unchanging and perfect would function better than an eye that
 is not, and, in that sense, it is good in a way that an always-changing
 and less perfect eye is not.
 Notice that this account of the goodness of eyes is fundamentally dif-
 ferent from the Platonic teleological account I have sketched. In addition
 to accounting for the efficient cause of eyes and the functional goodness
 of eyes, the Platonic teleological explanation also explains why eyes are
 good for humans : having eyes offers humans a means to becoming more
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 virtuous. The Form-of-the-Good explanation of eyes only explains why
 the eye is a good object of its kind; it does not explain the goodness of
 eyes in terms of its benefit for humans' ethical development.
 We have reason to believe that Plato would not have been satisfied
 with the Form-of-the-Good explanation of humans' having eyes. In the
 Górgias , Socrates considers whether ship pilots are good (511bl-512dl).
 He claims that what makes any kind of craftsman - such as horse-
 breeder, a ship pilot, or a doctor, for instance - a goodF (for "functionally
 good") craftsman is the degree to which the craftsman performs his
 function well. Given that the pilot's function is to transport passengers
 safely from one place to another, we may conclude that a goodF pilot is
 one who ensures that this goal is accomplished by saving his passengers
 from drowning.
 But Socrates claims that an account of a craftsman's goodp-ness is
 not enough. For example, a goodF pilot would save his passengers from
 drowning. However, it is not the case that saving a man from drowning
 is necessarily good for the pilot or for the passengers . Socrates points
 out, "[The ship pilot] cannot tell which of his fellow-passengers he has
 benefitted, and which of them he has injured in not allowing them to be
 drowned" (512a9-bl,Zeyl translation [Plato 1997a]). The pilot knows what
 is goodF; in other words, given what a pilot's specific function is, he knows
 what makes a pilot a goodF pilot. But he does not know how to guide his
 actions according to what is good for a particular person or situation.
 Surely we would expect that the Form of the Good explains goodness,
 but it is unclear as to how it explains goodness for the benefit of a specific
 sensible particular (that is, goodness for humans or goodness for ship
 passengers). Once again, the Platonic teleological explanation is superior
 to accounts invoking the Form of the Good, since the Platonic teleological
 explanation not only accounts for how humans came to have eyes and
 why the eye in particular is functionally good, but it also explains why
 having eyes can contribute to human virtue.
 Let us revisit the seemingly rhetorical questions we raised in section
 1 above: (1) "Isn't the best outcome 'best' by virtue of participating in
 the Form of the Good?" Perhaps the "best" outcome does participate in
 the Form of the Good, but the problem is that an explanation in terms
 of the Form of the Good cannot explain how it came to participate in the
 Form of the Good (efficient cause); nor can it explain why the outcome
 has the particular features it does. This is because its features are
 unique adaptations that the Demiurge has crafted to accommodate the
 ontological difference between the model (the Form) and the sensible
 particular. Along these lines, Lennox describes the inadequacy of Formal
 explanations as follows:
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 What can be explained about a thing by citing its participation in
 the Good itself on its own? Only this, that it happens to be good. But
 Socrates has much grander hopes for a theory which used Nous bring-
 ing about various arrangements because they were good. In each case,
 goodness out to account, not only for the goodness of a state of affairs,
 but also for that state of affairs itself - that is, we ought to be able to
 say, citing its goodness, why intelligence brought that about. . . . We
 may wonder, then, whether Plato ever considered form participation
 as an adequate account of why a particular or sort of particular can
 be said to have some feature or other (1985, 203-4).
 In other words, an explanation in terms of the Form of the Good simply
 tells us that a particular is good, but it cannot explain why the particular
 has the features it does (that is, what makes it good). Participation in a
 Form is insufficient for explaining a particular's features, because the
 particular has features that the Form does not. It has these features
 thanks to the Demiurge, who used his judgment to figure out how best
 to manifest Formal goodness in the particular.
 (2) "Isn't what is 'best' determined by a Form?" For example, the Philos-
 opher-King looks to the Forms to model his city, and the Demiurge uses
 the Form Living Thing as his model when crafting the cosmos. It seems
 that what is best is not determined by the agent's own judgment but,
 rather, by something external to the agent, namely, the relevant Form.
 It is true that the Form determines what is good and that the Demiurge
 uses a Form as his model, but the Demiurge still has to figure out how
 best to approximate this good in a different ontological medium, the sen-
 sible world. The agent uses the Form as his model, but he needs to use
 his judgment about how to instantiate the good-making features of the
 model in the changing, visible world. Recall Johansen's analogy of the
 artist attempting to turn a piece of music into prose (2004, 57). The Form,
 like the music, provides the model, but, since the model is of a different
 ontological category from the product, it takes a craftsman's judgment to
 figure out how best to approximate the features of the model in the me-
 dium of a sensible particular. While the Form of the Good might account
 for a thing's goodness, it cannot account for the features it has that make
 it the best it can possibly be given sensible-world conditions. Thus, the
 Formal explanation is not a sufficient explanation of the state of affairs.
 (3) "Aren't agents motivated always to do what is best because of the
 Form of the Good?" This seems like a reasonable assumption. However,
 once again, an explanation in terms of the Form of the Good is not suf-
 ficient. The agent's relationship with Form of the Good can explain why
 the agent desires the good, but it cannot explain what particular actions
 he has to take to fulfill this desire. In other words, an explanation in
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 terms of the Form of the Good can explain why an agent is motivated
 to bring about the good, but it can't explain what "bringing about the
 good" looks like in a specific sensible-world circumstance.
 5. Concluding Remarks
 Let me reiterate that I am not arguing against the idea that the Form
 of the Good is a final cause on some definition of final cause; my ar-
 gument is that, contrary to Assumption P, it cannot be the case that
 Form-of-the-Good explanations are equivalent Platonic teleological
 explanations because to Platonic teleological explanations surpass what
 Form-of-the-Good explanations are capable of explaining. For example,
 both the Platonic teleological explanation of the cosmos and the Platonic
 teleological explanation of human eyes account for efficient causation,
 whereas Form-of-the-Good explanations cannot. Moreover, the Platonic
 teleological explanation of human eyes accounts for the goodness of eyes
 for humans , rather than merely their functional goodness.
 One would expect that we could imagine a Platonic teleological ex-
 planation that lines up with an explanation in terms of the Form of the
 Good. But, as I have shown, any attempt at drawing this connection in
 a way that is consistent with the text encounters significant obstacles.
 One such obstacle is that the two explanations point to different sources
 dictating the good-making features of sensible objects. On the Form-of-
 the-Good explanation of the cosmos, for example, the cosmos is spherical
 because of its participation in the Form Living Thing. On the Platonic
 teleological explanation of the cosmos, the Demiurge must deliberate on
 how best to craft the cosmos. Clearly, this Platonic teleological explana-
 tion does not presuppose the Form-of-the-Good account because, if the
 Form-of-the-Good account were presupposed, then the cosmos would
 already be spherical and the Demiurge would not have to figure out
 what shape to make the cosmos or how to make the cosmos good. As we
 have seen, the Formal explanation cannot explain how Formal goodness
 is (albeit imperfectly) manifested in the sensible world.
 What I have shown in this paper is that the assumption that the Form
 of the Good is a final cause for Plato is inconsistent with the accounts
 of final causation that Plato gives in the Phaedo and Timaeus . Thus,
 Assumption P is unwarranted.
 Christopher Newport University
 Keywords: Plato, Form of the Good, teleology, Timaeus, Phaedo , final
 cause, explanation.
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 NOTES
 1. I discuss a similar interpretation of Platonic teleological explanations
 in Jelinek 2015, but in that paper I focus on Plato's account of the goodness of
 actions ; here, I focus on his account of the goodness of objects.
 2. The ultimate purpose of the passage is to set the stage for Socrates's
 proof of the immortality of the soul, but the passage also lends insight into
 Plato's theory of explanation more generally (Ferejohn 2009, 154-58).
 3. Much has been said about what we can conclude about Plato's theory
 of explanation from the Phaedo passage. See Lennox 1985, 199-200; Strange
 1985, 26-27; Vlastos 1969.
 4. This is not to say that Aristotle's teleology excludes an agent whose desires
 and actions are the aitiai for the particular end in question - he does offer teleo-
 logical explanations of this type. The point is that Aristotle's teleology does not
 require a conscious, intelligent, and purposeful agent, whereas Plato's teleology
 does.
 5. I address the question of whether the Demiurge of the Timaeus should
 be taken literally as an agent with beliefs, desires, and such in section 3.
 6. I am grateful to both the editor and an anonymous reviewer for raising
 these questions.
 7. In my previous work (Jelinek 2015), I claimed that the circle example
 illustrates a weakness in Santas's theory. I have since come to appreciate this
 example as one that is, in fact, consistent with the text.
 8. For arguments in support of the literal interpretation, see Broadie 2012,
 7-26; Hackforth 1965, 439-47; Johansen 2004, 48-68; Lennox 1985, 195-218; Menn
 1995, 6-13; Robinson 1986, 103-19; Strange 1985, 25-39; Vlastos 1939, 71-83.
 9. For a defense of this interpretation of Necessity, see Broadie 2012,
 233-34; Jelinek 2011; Johansen 2004, 92-116.
 10. For example, when crafting the human skull (74e7-75cl0) the lesser gods
 that the Demiurge has enlisted for the task face a dilemma: either they use a
 thick material, in which case humans would live longer but be less intelligent,
 or they use a thin material, in which case humans would be more intelligent but
 have a shorter life span. Plato says that, because of Necessity, no combination
 of the four elements will yield a perfectly protective yet thin material. For an
 insightful discussion of Necessity, see Johansen 2004, 104-5.
 REFERENCES
 Aristotle. 1995. "Physics." In Aristotle : Selections , translated by Terence Irwin
 and Gail Fine. Indianapolis, IN: Hacke tt.
This content downloaded from 
              52.3.73.196 on Wed, 08 Jul 2020 16:32:46 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 115
 Broadie, Sarah. 2012. Nature and Divinity in Plato's Timaeus. Cambridge:
 Cambridge University Press.
 Cherniss, Harold. 1944. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy. Vol. 1.
 Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1944.
 Cooper, J. 1997. "The Psychology of Justice in Plato." In Plato's Republic, edited
 by Richard Kraut, 17-30. New York: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers.
 Ferejohn, M. 2009. "Knowledge and the Forms in Plato." In A Companion to
 Plato , edited by Hugh H. Benson, 146-62. Maiden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
 Hackforth, R. 1965. "Plato's Theism." In Studies in Plato's Metaphysics , edited
 by R. E. Allen, 439-47. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
 Jelinek, Elizabeth. 2011. "Pre-Cosmic Necessity in Plato's Timaeus!' Apeiron
 44, no. 3: 287-306.
 Philosophical Inquiry 39, nos. 3-4: 56-72.
 Johansen, Thomas Kjeller. 2004. Plato's Natural Philosophy : A Study of the
 Timaeus-Critias. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 Phronesis 59, no. 4: 297-320.
 Kraut, Richard. 1992. "The Defense of Justice in Plato's Republic." In The Cam-
 bridge Companion to Plato , edited by Richard Kraut, 277-337. Cambridge:
 Cambridge University Press.
 Lennox, James G. 1985. "Plato's Unnatural Teleology." In Platonic Investiga-
 tions, , edited by Domenie J. O'Meara, 195-218. Washington, DC: Catholic
 University of America Press.
 Menn, Stephen. 1995. Plato on God as Nous. Carbondale: Southern Illinois
 University.
 Penner, Terry. 2003. "The Forms, the Form of the Good, and the Desire for Good
 in Plato's Republic ." The Modern Schoolman 80, no. 3: 191-223.
 Plato. 1993. Phaedo. Translated with Introduction and Notes by David Gallop.
 Oxford: Clarendon Press.
 Works , edited by John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis, In:
 Hackett.
 Woodruff. In Plato : Complete Works , edited by John M. Cooper and D. S.
 Hutchinson. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
 In Plato : Complete Works , edited by John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson.
 Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
 edited by John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997.
This content downloaded from 
              52.3.73.196 on Wed, 08 Jul 2020 16:32:46 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 116 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY
 plete Works , edited by John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis,
 IN: Hackett.
 napolis, IN: Hackett.
 Reeve, C. D. C. 1988. Philosopher-Kings. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
 Press.
 Robinson, T. M. 1986. "Understanding the Timaeus." In Proceedings of the Bos-
 ton Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy , vol. 2, edited by John J. Cleary,
 103-19. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
 Rowe, Christopher. 2007. "The Form of the Good and the Good in Plato's Re-
 public In Pursuing the Good : Ethics and Metaphysics in Plato's Republic,
 edited by Douglas L. Cairns, Fritz-Gregor Herrman, and Terry Penner,
 124-53. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
 Santas, Gerasimos. 1980. "The Form of the Good in Plato's Republic" Philosophi-
 cal Inquiry 2, no. 1: 374-403
 der Philosophie 67, no. 3: 223-45.
 Sedley, David. 1998. "Platonic Causes." Phronesis 43, no. 2: 114-32.
 Strange, Steven K. 1985. "The Double Explanation in the Timaeus" Ancient
 Philosophy 5, no. 1: 25-39.
 Teloh, Henry. 1981. The Development of Plato's Metaphysics. University Park:
 The Pennsylvania University Press.
 Vlastos, Gregory. 1939. "The Disorderly Motion in the Timaeus." The Classical
 Quarterly 33, no. 2: 71-83.
 no. 3: 291-325.
 White, Nicholas P. 1979. A Companion to Plato's Republic. Indianapolis IN:
 Hackett.
 Hugh H. Benson, 356-72. Maiden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
This content downloaded from 
              52.3.73.196 on Wed, 08 Jul 2020 16:32:46 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
